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**1990/11/28**

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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

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ACTION MEMORANDUM *ch*  
S/S 11/28

CAPTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK)  
5/25/95

DIST:  
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TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Robert M. Kimmitt *RMK*

FROM: EAP - Richard H. Solomon *Rich*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with PRC Foreign Minister Qian on  
Thursday, November 29: Additional Talking Points

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to draw on the attached talking points during your  
Thursday meeting with Foreign Minister Qian.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

[REDACTED] B1

[REDACTED] Qian's  
visit most unfortunately coincides with press reports of  
Beijing's decision to try Tiananmen detainees now charged with  
sedition, a capital offense. These reports resulted in charges  
of increasing repression within China on the eve of Qian's  
arrival in Washington. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] B1

[REDACTED] The initial press and  
Congressional reaction to news of Qian's visit was pragmatic  
and rational, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] B1

[REDACTED] Foreign Minister Qian  
remarked to the press in Beijing just before departure  
November 28 that reports of a PRC decision to vote in favor of  
the resolution were groundless. Qian hinted to the press that  
China would abstain.

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We believe that the PRC may still vote in favor of the resolution.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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RECOMMENDATION

That you draw on the attached talking points during your Thursday meeting with Foreign Minister Qian.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachment:

Talking Points

Drafted: EAP/CM - KWiedemann  
SECMDR 357 11/28/90

Cleared: EAP - DAnderson  
P - CKartman

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
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
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TALKING POINTS



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- o We remain committed to your successful visit to Washington and getting our relations back on track, including working toward my visit to China in the future. We require a positive atmosphere to achieve these results, [redacted]

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TALKING POINTS: CHINA--INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

- o Congressional leaders and the media reacted pragmatically to news of your visit to Washington because it is understood that the US and China must work together and maintain solidarity in a crisis of this sort.
- o The US and China have common interests in creating a new international environment in which the United Nations plays a decisive role in ensuring global peace and security. As major powers and members of the Perm Five, we also bear special responsibilities in this regard.
- o We must not let Saddam Hussein or those who would emulate him think that they can get away with gaining political and economic objectives by acts of naked aggression. It is essential to demonstrate to Saddam that the Security Council will authorize all necessary means to secure Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
- o The effort we and the other members of the Security Council have undertaken in the Gulf holds promise for the long term maintenance of peace in the post-Cold War world. If we fail at this attempt to stop aggression through UN action, the consequences will extend beyond the Persian Gulf--the world will be less secure and less stable.
- o Looking forward to your Washington visit--where we can discuss further our respective views of the long-term consequences of the Gulf crisis--I note that China's actions with respect to the crisis have had an important, positive effect on public opinion in the US.

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- o In the days ahead, I am hopeful that we can make substantial progress in our discussion of global, regional, and bilateral issues that demand our attention.
- o Our first step will be to ensure continued cooperation on the Gulf to achieve the peaceful outcome of this crisis.

  
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## TALKING POINTS: CHINA

### I. Gulf Crisis (Supplement to Core Points)

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- o As we have discussed before, we much prefer a peaceful resolution of this crisis, but Iraq must understand we will have no alternative but to use force if it fails to respond to U.N. calls to withdraw from Kuwait and give freedom to all foreign nationals.

- Your government has recently expressed understanding of this imperative.

- I understand that you and Shevardnadze both expressed the importance of ensuring that Iraq understands our commitment to use all means necessary is shared by all members of the Perm Five.

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- The solidarity of the Perm Five is essential if the U.N. is to become a credible instrument of peacekeeping. We face the dilemma that without a credible threat of force, Saddam Hussein will have no incentive to withdraw from Kuwait. And if he emerges from this crisis as a winner it will have the most serious long term consequences, not only for stability in the Gulf, but for the actions of other regional bullies and the loss of credibility of the United Nations as well.

### Appreciate Chinese Support

- o I appreciate China's continuing effort to pressure Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. I have been pleased at our close cooperation in the Perm Five on all ten Security Council resolutions on the Gulf crisis.

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- o As you and I agreed in Cairo, the strict enforcement of U.N. sanctions is one of the most effective ways to press Iraq to withdraw. Your continuing support for these sanctions has been a major contribution to our common effort.

## International Solidarity Critical

- o We have maintained together an unwavering international solidarity in the face of Iraqi aggression for over three months. We must continue to show our resolve.
- o Continuing efforts by Saddam to reinforce his position in Kuwait and southern Iraq indicate he believes he can erode our solidarity, wait out the international community and hold on to the fruits of his aggression. We must convince him otherwise. Unless he withdraws, the possibility of a military clash will grow inexorably.  B1
- o We must all state as clearly as possible that we all have the same position: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, restore its full sovereignty, and release all hostages it is holding. Otherwise the Iraqis must face new measures against them.

## Long Range Plans

- o As I have indicated before, removing Iraq from Kuwait and restoring that nation's sovereignty is only the first step toward securing a new stable political order in the Middle East.
- o At the same time we begin the process of withdrawing our forces from the Persian Gulf, we must ensure that there are security arrangements in the Gulf region sufficient to ensure that reckless aggression like Saddam Hussein's does not occur again.
- o In addition, the international community must take steps to ensure that Iraq does not continue to threaten its neighbors and indeed the whole world with weapons of mass destruction.
- o I would appreciate your thoughts as to how we might work together to accomplish these long range objectives.

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## II. CAMBODIA

- o We appreciated the cooperation of the Chinese delegation in working with us in Paris during the past week and the contributions the Chinese side made to the successful outcome. Obviously the credibility of the Perm Five process across the board is affected by how we do on this issue as well as on the Gulf.
- o It is important that we push the settlement process through to an early and successful conclusion. This means that we must obtain the cooperation of our individual Cambodian friends in order to accomplish this.
- o We are prepared to live with almost any arrangement in Cambodia which will restore peace and independence to that troubled land. We have taken very seriously your statements that you would not support the Khmer Rouge establishing a dominant position or returning to warfare.
- o In this connection, it would be unfortunate if the Khmer Rouge were seen to be blocking resolution of the SNC leadership issue because it insisted on having a Vice Chairman position.
- o
- o We are encouraged by your active diplomacy with both the Cambodians and the Vietnamese.
- o We believe it very important that the Khmer Rouge continue to refrain from any military action during the dry season now beginning, particularly while we try to work out a peace settlement. Vietnam and Phnom Penh will only try to use any renewed fighting to raise the cry of "genocide" and draw support to Hun Sen.

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## III. CHINA AND VIETNAM

- o We are concerned that Hanoi is backing away from its support of the Perm Five framework for a settlement in Cambodia. What can we both do to get Vietnam back on track?
- o I suggest that both of us maintain pressure on Hanoi and not take steps toward normalization until there is a signing of the final agreement in Paris. Moreover, I believe we should both hold off full normalization of our relations with Vietnam until the new government resulting from elections is installed in Cambodia.
- o We agree with you that it is up to the Cambodians to decide who should be elected vice chairman of the SNC, if anyone, and that it is essential that Sihanouk first be elected chairman. Hanoi must persuade Phnom Penh to compromise on this issue, joining Prince Sihanouk's meeting with faction heads and finding a compromise solution.
- o Much more important is securing both Vietnam and Phnom Penh's commitment to the Perm Five framework, which they accepted in Jakarta last September but appear to be moving away from in recent weeks.
- o I would be interested in hearing your further ideas on how to secure Vietnam's support for the settlement process.

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## BACKGROUND: CAMBODIA

### Perm Five Meeting

- o The Chinese displayed flexibility on almost every issue discussed in the November 23-25 Paris meeting, which reached agreement on all draft documents for a comprehensive political settlement.
- o They squared off with the Soviets, however, on demands for verification of Vietnamese troop withdrawals and on the issue of the SNC chairmanship. The Chinese wanted Prince Sihanouk elected without conditions, while the Soviets tried to ensure a role for Hun Sen as vice chairman. Only after lengthy negotiations did the two agree to language in the communique calling on the Cambodians to make such decisions.


### The Cambodian Factions

- o Following a private meeting with A/S Solomon in Paris, Prince Sihanouk issued a call for the other factional leaders to join him in Paris in an unofficial meeting to try to resolve the SNC leadership issue.
- o KPNLF president Son Sann accepted the invitation immediately, and on November 27 FBIS reported Phnom Penh Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong was en route to Paris, at French invitation. The Khmer Rouge have apparently hinted at their willingness to participate, as well.
- o Acceptance by the Cambodians of the draft agreement and resolution of the SNC leadership impasse are critical next steps in the peace process. The Paris Conference co-chairmen are prepared to meet with the SNC, preferably once the impasse ends, to explain the documents and seek its concurrence preparatory to a Coordinating Committee meeting, perhaps in mid-December in Paris.
- o We will be asking the Chinese, the Soviets, the Vietnamese and all others with influence over the Cambodian parties to urge them to resolve their differences and move forward toward a peace conference.

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## BACKGROUND: IRAQ

### Condemnation of Iraq

- o The Chinese Government immediately denounced Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It demanded Iraq withdraw and immediately restore the legitimate government of Kuwait.
- Foreign Minister Qian Qichen repeated to the UN General Assembly China's strong condemnation of Iraq's actions and stressed its desire for a peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis.
- All of China's senior leaders have repeated China's demand for Iraq's complete withdrawal in every forum available, including meetings with Iraq's Vice Premier Ramadan during his visit to Beijing in September.

### U.N. Resolutions and Sanctions Enforcement

- o China has voted for all ten Security Council resolutions in response to Iraq's invasion. They have been active and constructive participants in the consultations leading to those resolutions.

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- As part of this embargo, China has refused to ship any food or medical supplies to Iraq until the U.N. certifies a humanitarian need.

### Slow Shift on Military Option

- o China has moderated significantly its rhetoric on military involvement by the major powers in the Persian Gulf. It has stopped claiming such deployments could complicate the situation.
- Instead China has expressed understanding and support for Saudi Arabia's right to request foreign military assistance in its own self defense.
- Most recently China has also indicated that it recognizes military action may be unavoidable if peaceful measures fail. Qian's statements in the Middle East are the clearest statements to date.

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## BACKGROUND: CHINA AND VIETNAM

- o China has begun to improve its relations with Vietnam following the Soviet withdrawal from Vietnam and Vietnam's decision to withdraw, at least in part, from Cambodia.

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- o The Vietnamese continue to hold out for a powerful role for the Phnom Penh regime during the transitional period, and may have approved of recent statements by Hun Sen and others rejecting a strong UN role.
- o Having lost Soviet and Eastern European economic assistance and having failed to get the U.S. trade embargo lifted, Vietnam is anxious to upgrade its relations with China to protect its economic and political interests in the region. China, for its part, wants to ensure that Vietnam's military presence is fully withdrawn from Cambodia and improve its credentials as a major regional power working to achieve stability in Southeast Asia.
- o China has linked improvement of its relations with Vietnam to achievement of a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia. Although it already has low-level diplomatic relations with Hanoi, Beijing has reserved full normalization of relations until after a settlement, using language very like our own formulations vis-a-vis Vietnam.

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BACKGROUND PAPER: CHINA

## A Two-Part Visit

Beijing's decision to send Foreign Minister Qian to New York to discuss possible PRC support for a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in the Gulf, and then on to Washington, offers both sides the opportunity to get the bilateral relationship back on track. [REDACTED]

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## Your Agenda in New York

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## Your Agenda in Washington

Qian's visit to Washington, depending on the PRC vote in New York, could mark a turning point in US-China relations. In your discussions with him, you may wish to underline the importance we attach to the relationship, and to cooperation with China to insure peace and stability in the East Asian and Pacific region, and globally as well.

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We can point to other positive steps as well. In the interest of supporting China's economic development, we initiated a process with other G-7 countries to restore, to the extent possible within our legal constraints, World Bank lending to China. Despite strong Congressional criticism, the President renewed China's MFN trade status and fought off persistent Congressional attempts to overturn the decision and attach new conditions on MFN. The President also argued against new congressional sanctions and vetoed the Export Administration Act, in part because it contained yet another prohibition on satellite exports to China.

Looking ahead, we are preparing to take unilateral steps to lift sanctions mandated in the 1990 Foreign Relations Authorization Act on the licensing of civilian-use items on the munitions list and on the export of satellites. We also expect to have Presidential approval for the licensing of at least one, and possibly more, high-performance computers that have been pending for the past several months.

The case for our commitment to the bilateral relationship is strong, but we cannot rebuild the relationship by ourselves. The Chinese must understand that to resume fully normal relations, Beijing must take further steps with regard to the "package" we have discussed over the past year. As the recent MFN debate in Congress illustrated, China's human rights situation remains a bitter and divisive issue on the Hill. Our bilateral frictions continue: detention of political prisoners held for peaceful expression of political views, jamming of VOA, and most recently, the announcement of a decision to try two prominent dissidents on charges of sedition (a capital offense). The Chinese must understand that mutual steps will be required to advance relations, and that further evidence of disregard for our human rights concerns will diminish prospects for significant improvement in our relations.

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With Chinese cooperation, we can take actions which would "heal the wounds of Tiananmen" and proceed to discussion of important global, regional, and bilateral issues of concern to both countries.

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Next Steps

Qian's visit could be the catalyst for positive change in our relations. We should view his visit as part of a process leading next to a series of events in the months ahead: a trip by Bob Kimmitt (the Chinese are anxious to pin down the dates on this one); Assistant Secretary Schifter's visit; Under Secretary Bartholomew's visit; and the entire process could be capped by your travel to China to sign a joint statement that would reaffirm the US-PRC relationship based on cooperation in the Gulf and on Cambodia, as well as progress achieved on human rights and proliferation issues in the preceding exchange of visits.

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